By all measures, the continuous growth and expansion of private equity has been astounding. From a $30 billion allocation in 1992 worldwide, the industry has grown approximately 180 times fold in less than a quarter century. Once regarded as a small blip at the margin of alternative investments,...

This conceptual paper investigates the reasons behind the recent increase in corporate engagement by institutional shareholders. Whilst the rise of institutional ownership is nothing new, what has changed is that large economies of scale in the fund management industry have resulted in ownership...

We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...

We develop a model to study the impact of corporate governance on firm investment decisions and industry competition. In the model, governance structure affects the distribution of shares among short- and long-term oriented investors, the robustness of the management regarding possible...

This paper examines executive compensation in the subsidiaries of business groups in China. Analyzing a sample of China business groups (the so-called “XiZu JiTuan” in Chinese) from 2003 to 2012, we find convincing evidence of the use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in the executive...

Equity ties between businesses change the division of the firms joint profits, thereby affecting incentives for relation-specific investments and other strategic actions. Depending on which side owns the equity and how readily the equity can be resold, we find that the changed incentives can...

This paper provides new evidence on the structure, dynamics and performance effects of corporate boards in publicly traded companies in Russia. It takes advantage of a new and unique longitudinal dataset of virtually all Russian companies whose shares were traded in the RTS/MICEX/MOEX over...

We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...

The aim of the paper is to test two hypotheses: on one hand, the aim is to analyse if firm’s executive rewards can be explained just by the hierarchical structure of the firm (Model One) while on the other we want to study the correlation between the level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO)...

Since the UK adopted the world’s first stewardship code in 2010, stewardship codes have proliferated across Asia. Given the UK Code’s prominence, it is tempting to assume that every other stewardship code preforms the same function as the UK Code. This assumption belies the truth: all these...