Academics and regulators have given significant attention to the impact of institutional investors on the companies in which they invest. Some are concerned that the institutional investors act as common owners. But in their active ownership policies institutional investors often say they are...

We investigate whether limited investor attention is a factor in the effectiveness of institutional shareholder activism. Prior research has shown that an inability of market participants to allocate sufficient intellectual effort to the investment decision can have an impact on market price and...

In this study we examine the relation between corporate governance and institutional ownership. Our empirical results show that the fraction of a company's shares that are held by institutional investors increases with the quality of its governance structure. In a similar vein, we show that the...

This paper investigates the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the relation between institutional ownership (IO) and firm innovation. We find that US firms investing in innovation attract more institutional capital post-SOX. Prior literature identifies two SOX effects on the average US...

We examine the role of institutional investors in corporate governance in an environment where ownership is concentrated. The presence of dominant shareholders alters the role of institutional investors by limiting their voting influence; by shifting the focus from shareholder-manager conflicts...

Institutional investors report that they prefer to invest in firms with greater board independencedespite the fact that researchers have been unable to demonstrate a link between boardindependence and firm performance. We investigate whether differences among institutionalinvestors affect these...

This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover...