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Strategic Games of the Violence in the Civil Wars

Estrada, Fernando - 2013

This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling/Nozick/Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159027

Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies

Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2008

We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047845

The Core in Normal Form Games

Koczy, Laszlo A. - 2003

equilibrium binding agreements. In our final section we discuss the predominance of the grand coalition and suggest a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014089085

Network Games with Local Correlation and Clustering

Lamberson, PJ - 2015

In many contexts an individual's beliefs and behavior are affected by the choices of his or her social or geographic neighbors. This influence results in local correlation in people's actions, which in turn affects how information and behaviors spread. Previously developed frameworks capture...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014138245

Games, Fixed Points and Mathematical Economics

Ewald, Christian-Oliver - 2007

These are my Lecture Notes for a course in Game Theory which I taught in the Winter term 2003/04 at the University of Kaiserslautern. I am aware that the notes are not yet free of error and the manuscrip needs further improvement. I am happy about any comment on the notes

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051925

Delegation Versus Centralization : The Role of Externalities

Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - 2012

We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors. The principal can either contract both agents in a centralized manner, or delegate one agent to contract the other. We show that the choice of the principal depends on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054349

What Determines a Game to Be Cooperative or Non-Cooperative?

Li, Jia-wei - 2009

It is not only the rule of a game that determines whether the game is cooperative or not in some instances. The historical strategies of the players in the game have a great effect on it also. Rational players will choose their strategies to make the game to be cooperative or non-cooperative,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062704

The Formation of Networks with Transfers Among Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Bloch, Francis - 2005

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071738

A Principal's Optimal Double Extortion Empty Core Game

Nieva, Ricardo - 2004

coalition structure of the game is examined and it is shown that under reasonable conditions its core is empty. To predict the … outcome in terms of coalition structures, we generalize the Aumann-Myerson (1988) solution. Conditions are given under which …'t deviate and the two-agent coalition is stable or "subgameperfect". It is also shown that the Apex game arises as a special …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074284

Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems

Huberman, Bernardo A.; Hogg, Tad - 2006

We present a quantum solution to coordination problems that can be implemented with existing technologies. It provides an alternative to existing approaches, which rely on explicit communication, prior commitment or trusted third parties. This quantum mechanism applies to a variety of scenarios...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079969