The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous … implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms if and only if the prior distribution of agents’ types satisfies … the Coalition Beliefs Determine Preferences (CBDP) property. When the CBDP property holds, these mechanisms can be …

, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally … that specifies the negotiation procedure underlying coalition formation. Therefore, it forms a bridge between the non …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …

the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …

In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperative game. Players … choose independently which coalition they want to join. The payoffs to the players are determined by an allocation rule on … the underlying game and the coalition structure that results from the strategies of the players according to some …

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure …

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when … externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be … which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterize the resulting payoff …

. Joining a coalition entails setting the policy variable to maximize the coalitions' aggregate payoff at a Nash equilibrium …

bargaining solution, for games where the worth of all pairwise coalition is less than a third of the grand coalition value; the … Shapley value, for games where the sum of the value created by all pairwise coalitions is greater than the grand coalition … value; or the nucleolus, for games where only the 'natural coalition' among two 'natural partners' creates significant value …