and monotonic on the contracts. If the grand coalition is not efficient we show that bargaining delays arise in positive …-externality games. Otherwise, if the grand coalition is efficient, there are no bargaining delays and convergence to the grand coalition …

in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete … among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which at each possible partition any new coalition can decide the … can decide whether or not to support a coalition's move: they know which future partition, and hence payoffs, will be … probabilities that are always above some e > 0, then there is a behavior profile in which no coalition has a profitable one …

players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called optimal sharing which … stabilises all cartels that are possibly stable under any rule. Under optimal sharing the grand coalition is the unique stable …

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …