contains the Core, it eliminates the "dominated" coalition structures, and has sharp implications for weighted majority games … agent within the winning coalition is expected to obtain a payoff share proportional to her relative bargaining power. The …

coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining … concerned with the characterisation of equilibrium coalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain … conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterisation results are especially sharp for symmetric partition …

schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …

We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a … noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core …

in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete … among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the …

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

while deepening provision of global public goods. The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) is a prime example of an …