In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies. From a cooperative point of view this leads to two different classes of cooperative games. We show that cooperative oligopoly...

The special class of conservative charge systems for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations is introduced. These conservative charge systems lead to single-valued rules for mcst situations, which can also be described with the aid of obligation functions and are, consequently, cost...

In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is...

A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, which is introduced by Bird in 1976. The Bird core correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity properties and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for...

This paper studies two classes of two-person zero-sum games in which the strategies of both players are of a special type.Each strategy can be split into two parts, a taking and a guessing part.In these games two types of asymmetry between the players can occur.In the first place, the number of...

In this paper the equal split-off set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-off set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution...

This paper deals with the problem of how cooperative game theory can be useful in practical situations. First a survey is given of sharing problems arising from practice which were also helpful in developing or supporting the cooperative game theory. Then some cases in cooperation in container...

The aim of this paper is to introduce and axiomatically characterize the P-value as a rule to solve the cost sharing problem in minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations. The P-value is related to the Kruskal algorithm for finding an mcst. Moreover, the P-value leads to a core allocation of...

Airport profit games are a generalization of airport cost games as well as of bankruptcy games. In this paper we present a simple algorithm to compute the nucleolus of airport profit games. In addition we prove that there exists an unique consistent allocation rule in airport profit problems,...