Discussion of "The Pricing Behavior of Firms in the Euro Area: New Survey Evidence" by S. Fabiani, M. Druant, I. Hernando, C. Kwapil, B. Landau, C. Loupias, F. Martins, T. Mathä, R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl, and A. Stockman (2004); Presented at the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) Conference on...

"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...

As digital technologies increase the occurrence of big bang disruptions across industries, companies old and new find they have less time both to profit from their own disruptor and to unleash the next one. This article describes the drivers of this phenomenon, and offers strategic responses...

We study the influence of middle managers (“supervisors”) on financial misconduct at financial advisory firms. Individual supervisor fixed effects explain twice as much variation in branch misconduct as firm fixed effects. Studying supervisors at different branches within the same firm-year,...

The nature of disruptive innovation, first studied by Joseph Schumpeter, has changed dramatically in the wake of rapidly and predictably deflating costs for embedded digital technology. New disruptors now enter the marker both better and cheaper than existing products. The result is devastating...

To date, much of the literature on institutional economics has relied on abstract metaphors based in exchange. Thus, Williamson introduced the fundamental insights surrounding his “transaction costs” model and discussed the governance of contracts in exchange relationships. Yet organizations...

Focusing on proving or disproving Transaction Cost Economics has led to a relative neglect of some key drivers of vertical scope, such as differences in productive capabilities (as opposed to capabilities of governance). We consider how productive capability differences can shape vertical scope...

"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...

"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...

This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts.  It motivates the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body relationship and the relationships between Japanese automobile manufacturers and their subcontractors.  It...