This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following...

We develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment in which industrial firms produce environmentally harmful emissions. A government controls the emissions by assigning emission quotas to firms, and permits could be issued and freely traded as financial instruments across...

This paper explores the theoretical linkage between habit and the environment through environmentally harmful consumption affected by habitual behavior. It is shown that habit formation of consumption has both negative and positive effects on environmental quality. Whether the positive effect...

This paper presents a simple model that displays a joint determination of income inequality and intergenerational mobility affected by redistributive taxation. The model shows that a larger redistribution improves equality and utility and enhances mobility when the poor are financially...

This paper develops a two-period overlapping-generations model with environmental externalities and uncertain lifetimes, and studies how two sources of population aging, greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth, affect the politically determined environmental tax and the quality...

This paper presents a two-period overlapping-generations model in which (i) firms create environmentally harmful emissions as by-products of production, and (ii) social security tax revenue from the working young is transferred to the retired elderly as pay-as-you go social security benefits. In...