This paper proposes an institutional innovation in the structure of public bonds that is intended to provide some of the advantages of private loans- active monitoring, tight covenants, and ease of reorganization-while retaining the benefits of liquidity and ease of diversification provided by...

Debt financing gives rise to conflicts of interest between creditors and stockholders that are better controlled with private loans than publicly traded bonds. However, public debt has greater liquidity and diversifiability. We propose an institutional innovation ? a "supertrustee" - that...

We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of non-tendering shareholders following successful takeovers. We describe a specific freezeout mechanism that is based on easily verifiable information, making it simple to implement in practice. We show that this mechanism induces desirable...

We provide an economic basis for permitting freeze outs of non-tendering shareholdersfollowing successful takeovers. We describe a specific freeze out mechanism based on easily verifiable information that induces desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both corporations with...

We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of non-tendering shareholdersfollowing successful takeovers. We describe a specific freezeout mechanism based on easily verifiable information that induces desirable efficiency and welfareproperties in models of both corporations with widely...

We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of nontendering shareholders following successful takeovers. We describe a specific freezeout mechanism based on easily verifiable information that induces desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both corporations with...