As European energy markets move towards deregulation, energy prices shift from classic ‘cost plus' prices towards market prices. Read also the accompanying <a href="http://www.cpb.nl/en/pressrelease/3213211/competition-lowers-energy-expenditures-end-users">press release</a>. We develop a model for the retail and wholesale energy markets in Europe, based on Bertrand competition in a two part...

This paper analyses the welfare effects of vertical integration of networks and trade in energy markets. Vertical integration reduces the effect of double marginalisation, thus increasing welfare. On the other hand, vertical integration hinders equal competition, rendering the vertically...

The aim of this paper is to study the impact of breaking up national gas sales consortia in Western Europe. We show, within a numerical model of the Western European natural gas market- that once the demand side of the market is liberalized, each producing country has an incentive to break up...

This article analyzes the pros and cons of ownership separation of the gas transportation network. This analysis is made with a specific test that confronts two pairs of different theoretical approaches on vertical integration. The result of this test shows that no uncontroversial solution can...

The mathematical formulation of a large-scale equilibrium natural gas simulation model is presented. Although large-scale natural gas models have been developed and used for energy security and policy analysis quite extensively (e.g., Holz (2007), Egging et al. (2008), Holz et al. (2009) and...

Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse firms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic firms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...

Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...

In this paper we reconsider Jansen et al.’s (2012) Cournot model of the European Union natural gas market with three major suppliers Russian Gazprom, Norwegian Statoil, and Algerian Sonatrach. To reflect Russia’s geopolitical consideration, we incorporate a relative market...

The mathematical formulation of a strategic Eurasian natural gas market model is presented. The model represents horizontal oligopolistic relationships among producers, bilateral market power between producer (Russia) and transit (Ukraine) countries, detailed transport constraints, and operation...

Since the late 90s,, European industries of electricity and gas have been subject to a process of concentration at both horizontal and vertical levels. At first glance, this consolidation is quite natural since, on the one hand, the application of European directives to open to competition has...