We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient...

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient...

Top responsiveness is a concept which provides a model of progressive society in wihch each player pays more attention to the best aspect of each coalition, and is shown to be a sufficient conditaion for the existence of core stable coalition structures. In this paper, we propose a new concept,...

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two...

The attention to environmental conditions of the planet drives many scientists to study and to analyze the externalities of the economic activities and their relapses on nature. The issue is quite complex because of the non-linear interactions between human and natural phenomena. Our intention...

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide sufficient...

We consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore the existence of stable coalition structures if only individual deviations are allowed. For two natural subdomains of separable preferences, namely preference domains based on (1) aversion to enemies and (2) appreciation of...

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

Despite the widespread acceptance of trust as an informal governance institution, our understanding of its origins is nascent. Our review of the literature identified two distinct explanations: trust emerges from either a shadow of the past (i.e. prior history) or a shadow of the future (i.e....