We show how incorporating Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler's (2010) notion of objective rationality into the α-MEU model of choice under ambiguity (Hurwicz, 1951) can overcome several challenges faced by the baseline model without objective rationality. The decision-maker (DM) has...

We show how incorporating Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler's (2010) notion of objective rationality into the α-MEU model of choice under ambiguity (Hurwicz, 1951) can overcome several challenges faced by the baseline model without objective rationality. The decision-maker (DM) has...

Under which condition does the set of desirable uncertain prospects expand when wealth increases? We show that the decreasing concavity (DC) of the utility function u is necessary and sufficient in the α-maxmin expected utility model. In the smooth ambiguity aversion model with the ambiguity...

We propose a method for conducting inference on impulse responses in structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) when the impulse response is not point identified because the number of equality restrictions one can credibly impose is not sufficient for point identification and/or one imposes sign...

Probabilistic risk beliefs are key drivers of economic and health decisions, but people are not always certain about their beliefs. We study these "imprecise probabilities", also known as ambiguous beliefs. We show that imprecision is measurable separately from the levels of risk beliefs. People...