We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. We explore the link between the allocation and nations ́contributions that occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and...

We study the efficiency of centralized fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary. In this setting, a country's outside option during budget negotiations is to withdraw its contribution to the centralized budget and consume its full income. This implies a crucial...

We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. We explore the link between the allocation and nations' contributions that occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and...

We estimate state-dependent government spending multipliers for the United States. We use a Factor-Augmented Interacted Vector Autoregression (FAIVAR) model. This allows us to capture the time-varying monetary policy characteristics including the recent zero interest rate lower bound (ZLB)...