We use laboratory experiments to compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible good auctions. 'Standard' and 'uniform' allocation rules admit different types of low-price equilibria, which are eliminated by a 'hybrid' rule. We observe little evidence of revenue differences among the...

The dissertation studies game theoretical models of competitive bidding on multi-unit auction markets. The analysis concerns both monopoly and oligopoly settings. A major part of the thesis deals with equilibrium bidding in variable supply auctions – trade mechanisms in which a monopoly seller...

This paper investigates the optimal bidding strategy for the initial bidder in takeover contests. In the theoretical model, the initial bidder has the choice between making a low or a high preemtive initial bid.(...)

This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a "pooling" type - with high...

We study the trading of real assets financed by collateralized loans in an agent based model of a continuous double auction. This approach provides a complementary perspective on recent advances in the general equilibrium theory of endogenous leverage by studying a model that simultaneously...

A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetricindependent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility...

In many circumstances, a principal, who wants prices to be as low as possible, must contract with agents who would like to charge the monopoly price. This paper compares a Demsetz auction, which awards an exclusive contract to the agent bidding the lowest price (competition for the field) with...