In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...

This paper experimentally studies two simple interventions aimed at increasing public goods provision in settings in which accurate feedback about contributions is not available. The first intervention aims to exploit lying aversion by requiring subjects to send a non-verifiable ex post...

We experimentally study the impact of framing effects in a repeated sequential social dilemma game. Our between-subjects design consists of two group level ("Wall Street" vs. "Community") and two individual level ("First (Second) Movers" vs. "Leaders (Followers)") frames. We find that average...

This paper reports the experimental results of implicit pre-play communication on the equilibrium selection in threshold public goods game experiments. The existence of an asset market in which the right to participate in a public goods game with a provision point is auctioned off among a larger...

We report experimental findings on the impact of network structure on decentralized monitoring and punishment in public goods games. In the environments we study, individuals can only directly monitor and punish their immediate neighbors in an exogenously determined network. We examine...

We explore the extent to which information about the social value orientation (SVO) of group members influences contributions to a public good. We compare four networks of information - empty, pair, star and complete. We find that information about SVO has a significant impact on contributions...