We examine how the banking sector may ignite the formation of assetprice bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks,given lack of observability of effort, loan officers (or risk takers)are compensated based on the volume of loans but are penalized if bankssuffer a high...

This paper develops a continuous time asset pricing model of debt and equity in a framework where equityholders decide when to default but creditors decide when to liquidate. This framework is relevant for environments where creditors exert a significant influence on the timing of liquidation,...

When liquidity chasing banks is high, loan officers (or risk-takers) inside banks expect future losses to be readily rolled over. This insurance effect induces them to relax lending standards. The resulting access to cheap credit can fuel asset price bubbles in the economy. To curb such...

This article develops a continuous time asset pricing model of debt restructuring and values equity and debt by taking into account the fact that in practice the default point differs from the liquidation point. This separation allows us to delegate the liquidation decision to the creditors...