We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that...

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that...

We describe a new mechanism - what we call a booster draft - for allocating multiple, indivisible objects among a group of individuals. The mechanism’s appeal lies in its strategy-proofness and simplicity: Individuals take turns drawing objects from different sets - called boosters - and...

Negotiations typically involve multiple issues: in addition to the transaction price, bargainers need to determine the scope of an agreement. We design a lab experiment to study behavior across different information and bargaining structures in a multi-issue context. Consistent with recent...

We describe a new mechanism - what we call a booster draft - for allocating multiple, indivisible objects among a group of individuals. The mechanism's appeal lies in its strategy-proofness and simplicity: Individuals take turns drawing objects from different sets - called boosters - and simply...

This policy brief is concerned with the efficient allocation of subsidies for eco-friendly products. Examples include subsidies for cargo or e-bikes, electric cars, and energy efficient building retrofits. Inefficiencies arise when subsidies are allocated to consumers who would have bought...

We describe a new mechanism - what we call a booster draft - for allocating multiple, indivisibleobjects among a group of individuals. The mechanism’s appeal lies in its strategy-proofness andsimplicity: Individuals take turns drawing objects from different sets - called boosters - and...

We describe a new method — what we call booster draft mechanisms — for allocating multiple, indivisible objects among a group of individuals: Individuals take turns drawing objects from different sets — called boosters — and simply need to identify their favorite object when it’s their...

This policy brief is concerned with the efficient allocation of subsidies for eco-friendly products. Examples include subsidies for cargo or e-bikes, electric cars, and energy efficient building retrofits. Inefficiencies arise when subsidies are allocated to consumers who would have bought...