We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that...

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that...

We formulate a general model and stability notion for two-sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. These characteristics can be high-dimensional and need not...

Various forms of substitutability are essential for establishing the existence of equilibria and other useful properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions, and exchange economies with indivisible goods. We extend earlier models' definitions of substitutability to settings in which...

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive...

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

We propose a simple and practical "raffle" mechanism for allocating a limited supply of heterogeneous goods among unit demand consumers. While the mechanism is inspired by the common "tricky tray" raffle and a housing allocation system in Singapore, it has not been analyzed before, perhaps...

In many matching environments, agreements are multilateral and/or have externalities. We show that stability in these environments depends on agents' aggregate choice behavior. Two different conditions on aggregate choice ensure a stable outcome exists. One applies when contracts are...

In matching markets, the existence of stable matchings can only be guaranteed under substantive restrictions on preferences. We investigate how these results change in large markets, which we model with a continuum of agents of each type, following the work of Aumann (1964) on general...