We study the size of matchings (expected number of agents matched to some objects) generated by random mechanisms in the assignment problem. We show that no mechanism that satisfies two weak axioms, weak truncation robustness and weak regularity, achieves an approximation ratio better than 1 -...

We develop a theory of negotiation in which deals have multiple dimensions that can be bundled together. We use theory and experiments to show that in such settings efficient trade is possible even with substantial asymmetric information. The benefits of identifying areas of mutual gain guide...

We provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated –...

Each capacity-filling and substitutable choice rule is known to have a maximizer-collecting representation: there exists a list of priority orderings such that from each choice set that includes more alternatives than the capacity, the choice is the union of the priority orderings' maximizers...

We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are matched to but also the type of slots they receive. Such...

Mechanisms used to derive optimal allocations are generally designed under the premise that agents fully know their preferences. It is often impossible to duplicate these optimal allocations when agents imperfectly observe object characteristics. I present a crowdsourcing mechanism to...

This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of applicants under two of the most commonly used school admissions procedures: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism,...

In many random assignment problems, the central planner has their own policy objective, such as matching size and minimum quota fulfillment. A number of practically important policy objectives are not aligned with agents' preferences and known to be incompatible with strategy-proofness. This...

In the matching with contract literature, three well-known conditions (from stronger to weaker): substitutes, unilateral substitutes (US), and bilateral substitutes (BS) have proven very critical both in theory and practice. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of them by separately...