can disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we can … show strong reputation effects on the prices and service quality of drivers, while there is practically no evidence of a …

can disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we can … show strong reputation effects on the prices and service quality of drivers, while there is practically no evidence of a …

can disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we can … show strong reputation effects on the prices and service quality of drivers, while there is practically no evidence of a …

can disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we can … show strong reputation effects on the prices and service quality of drivers, while there is practically no evidence of a …

-lived agent builds trust over time and improves their reputation by keeping the scheme going. …

Status and reputation concerns are conjectured to be important especially in markets with information asymmetries … between buyers and sellers, such as in credence goods markets. To investigate the effects of status and reputation on …-mail requests to insurance brokers asking for an appointment. We find that status nudging and, with a larger effect size, reputation …

This paper studies the welfare impact of reputation/feedback systems in markets where both adverse selection and moral … reputation system is implemented, I find that 95 percent of total welfare loss from asymmetric information is eliminated. I also … consider a policy intervention that protects borrowers from accidental loss of reputation. My results suggest that introducing …