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Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries
Alysandratos, Theodore; Geōrganas, Sōtērēs; Sutter, … - 2022
can disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we can … show strong reputation effects on the prices and service quality of drivers, while there is practically no evidence of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013450739
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Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries
Alysandratos, Theodore; Geōrganas, Sōtērēs; Sutter, … - 2022
can disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we can … show strong reputation effects on the prices and service quality of drivers, while there is practically no evidence of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013448173
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Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries
Alysandratos, Theodore; Geōrganas, Sōtērēs; Sutter, … - 2022
can disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we can … show strong reputation effects on the prices and service quality of drivers, while there is practically no evidence of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013468203
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Reputation vs Selection Effects in Markets with Informational Asymmetries
Alysandratos, Theodore; Georganas, Sotiris; Sutter, Matthias - 2022
can disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we can … show strong reputation effects on the prices and service quality of drivers, while there is practically no evidence of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014242288
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Quality ambiguity and the market mechanism for credence goods
Benner, Dietrich (contributor) - 2004
post -. Trust has to replace own examination and verification. Applying Choquet-Expected Utility theory, a general model of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342061
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Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
Siemens, Ferdinand von; Kosfeld, Michael - 2009
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831629
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The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. -- credence goods ; experiment ; liability ; verifiability ; reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733215
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An economic response to unsolicited communication
Van Alstyne, Marshall; Loder, Thede C.; Walsh, Rick - 2011
If communication involves some transactions cost to both sender and recipient, what policy ensures that correct messages - those with positive social surplus - get sent? Filters block messages that harm recipients but benefit senders by more than transactions costs. Taxes can block positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195139
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A decentralized market with common values uncertainty : non-steady states
Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504686
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When a price is enough : implementation in optimal tax design
Renes, Sander; Zoutman, Floris T. - 2014
This paper studies the design of tax systems that implement a planner's second-best allocation in a market economy. An example shows that the widely used Mirrleesian (1976) tax system cannot implement all incentive-compatible allocations. Hammond's (1979) "principle of taxation" proves that any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403177