Corporate liability regimes have two major social goals: (i) inducing corporations to internalize all social ramifications of their activity; and (ii) inducing corporations to prevent, deter, and report their employee misconduct. The scholarly polemic has shown that none of the liability regimes...

This book considers how a regulatory enforcement policy should be designed to efficiently induce proactive corporate compliance. It first explores two major schools of thought regarding law enforcement, both the deterrence and cooperative approaches, and shows that neither of these represents an...

This book focuses on experiences with the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) of 2007 in China. It uses carefully-chosen case studies to examine how the competition authorities in China discuss cases and how they use economic reasoning in their decision-making process.

At times when the American economy faces enormous challenges, traditional prosecutorial measures that involve high public spending and immense collateral risks may hamper economic recovery. Economic meltdowns, such as the one we have been experiencing in recent years, call for a refreshment of...

Targeted monitoring systems have been embraced by many law and economics scholars, demonstrating that regulatory monitoring that prioritizes targets may efficiently increase the level of compliance. Only a few scholars, however, have paused to consider what criteria enforcement authorities...

Bribery and corruption violations are often hard to detect. For this reason, the U.S. enforcement authorities typically struggle to produce the right incentives for corporations to cooperate with public enforcement efforts in anti-corruption cases. In November 2017, following the successful...

Corporate liability regimes have two major social goals: inducing corporations to internalize all social ramifications of their activity; and inducing corporations to prevent, deter, and report their employee misconduct. The scholarly polemic has shown that none of the liability regimes...