We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our …

that although correlation tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium, in the presence of … uncertainty, a high level of correlation may discipline the strongly biased expert and may foster the informational content of the … experts’ advice under high uncertainty about correlation. In contrast to what may be expected, it may be optimal for the …

better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …

We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule … sequential disclosure rule, implemented in an ascending price auction. In the optimal disclosure mechanism, each losing bidder … learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder only learns that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. We …

We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and … the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing … bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder's information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the …

takeovers. After the auction, the winning bidder decides whether to make follow-up investments in the acquired asset and makes … the equity payment out of the revenue from it according to the auction outcome. Before the auction, the seller holds …

auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …