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A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibil- ity is satis?ed, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704635
We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060478
We study the effects of improvements in eBay’s rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did not lead to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038469
We study the effects of improvements in eBay’s rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did not lead to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157367
We study the effects of improvements in eBay's rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did not lead to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080789
of the flow-performance relationship, and I find empirical support for the theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012860014
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's preferred...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450575
This paper generalizes a conceptual insight in dynamic contracting with quasilin- ear payoffs: the principal does not need to pay any information rents for extract- ing the agent’s “new” private information obtained after signing the contract. This is shown in a general model in which the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704662
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