The main purpose of this paper is to explore the empirical evidence supporting the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation which is mixed. This is puzzling since studies of firm disclosures indicate that firms claim to use RPE based on both accounting measures and...

Previous studies of relative performance evaluation (RPE) for executive compensations in Western developed markets have produced mixed findings. This is partly because the dispersion of share ownership in Western capital markets does not closely correspond with the single-principal/multi-agent...

We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our empirical proxy for...

We examine the economic consequences of the recent adoption of SFAS 123(R) in the United States. Consistent with the conjectures of prior research, our results show that the removal of favorable accounting treatment for stock options post SFAS 123(R) results in a switch from stock options to...

Extant literature has emerged testing the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management and many these studies have documented that compensation contracts create strong incentives for management discretionary behavior over financial reporting. Previous studies also pointed...

Prior literature has documented ratcheting targets and a potential adverse incentive problem it may cause, and, as a remedy to the problem, proposed a firm's commitment to incomplete use of past performance in setting future targets. In this paper, we examine whether a firm makes such a...

In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues, document recent trends in executive pay in both U.S. and international firms, and analyze the evolution of executive pay over the past century. Most recent analyses of executive...

Disclosure rules for the Korean Stock Exchange require Korean firms to disclose average executive and employee pay. These disclosures provide a unique opportunity to examine factors influencing the executive pay multiple (executive-employee pay disparity) and its effects on performance. We find...

We examine factors influencing firms' strategic disclosure of executive pay in Korea. Because the disclosure rules in Korea do not mandate but only recommend that firms distinguish between inside executive directors and outside directors when reporting the average pay of directors, this...

We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our empirical proxy for...