This paper presents a new formulation of (approach to) threat analysis and management of security understood in a wide sense. Threats have been analyzed in a wide theoretical-methodological spectrum. Particular emphasis is put on the need for the system-wide analysis of threats, especially...

The first step in solving the problem of corruption lies in diagnosing its root causes and determining the underlying factors. One of the most important facilitators of corrupt transactions is intermediaries who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there...

This article presents a stochastic dynamic Generalized Nash-Cournot model to describe the evolution of the natural gas markets. The major gas chain players are depicted including: producers, consumers, storage, and pipeline operators, as well as intermediate local traders. Our economic structure...

In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and to choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of...

We use two theoretical categories of the work of Robert Nozick (1974), (a) protection agencies and (b) minimal state, to illustrate by analogy to the CMSP, the dilemmas arising from the use of private military in regions with civil wars and conflicts irregular. We see that the relations...

This paper investigates the conventional wisdom that markets would naturally allocate the rights for performing decisional task to those players who might be best suited to perform the task. We embedded the decisional tasks in a stylised setting of a game, motivated by Littlewood(1953) Red Hat...

In this paper I examine the paradoxical role of language in conflict situations. Support the war and negotiation belong to a game of "speech acts" structured by a double metonymic and metaphorical relationship. That metaphorical relationship between both conceptualizes negotiation as a condensed...

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their “exclusiveness” we find that these...