We study how beliefs about firm value respond to public information stemming from either public announcements or shareholder meetings. We focus on settings with homogeneous shareholders (i.e., agents with common preferences and opinions), where information is about which course of action is best...

This paper studies voting in shareholders meetings. We focus on the informational efficiency of different voting mechanisms, taking into account that they affect both management's incentives before the meeting and shareholders' decisions at the meeting. We first focus on the case in which the...

We develop a game theoretic model in which shareholders maximize the value of their portfolio and can buy or sell shares. Liquidity generates a shareholder dilemma: Voting for the policy that seems optimal for the firm maximizes portfolio value only when pivotal; in all other instances it is...

We theoretically examine voting for corporate policies when shareholders or board members face a trade-off between maximizing firm value and implementing social objectives (like minimizing pollution). If voters care about one social objective, we show that voting can successfully aggregate...

Governing a firm via "voice" requires sufficient shares to speak with one voice. However, the lead activist of a shareholder campaign typically only owns a small percentage of the target firm's shares. How can a small activist govern a firm via intervention? By developing a game-theoretic model,...

This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two...