We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and...

We study the problem of an organization that has a large number of potential tasks and has to choose which tasks to handle and which pair of experts assign to each of them. We propose a mechanism that generates a Pareto-efficient assignment in the weak core and is group strategy-proof. The...

We propose a model of sharing of public services among local governments. Our model is an application of Nicoló et al. (2023) and combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1971) and the division problem (Sprumont, 1991). I show that the SAM algorithm provided in...

When preferences are single-peaked (Black (1948),Black et al. (1958)) or group separable Ballester and Haeringer (2011), majority voting equilibria exist. Group separability has probably not received as much attention as single-peak separability because there are no intuitive assumptions about...

We propose a model of sharing of public services among local governments. Our model is an application of Nicolo et al. (2023) and combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (The Simple SAM)...

This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. The output of a coalition is determined by the sum of the productivities and the size of the coalition. We consider egalitarian societies in which coalitions split their surplus equally and individualistic...

We consider two versions of a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs and homogeneous goods. They differ in whether predatory pricing is allowed. For each version, we derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017). We contrast our...

We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set (MSS). The MSS is defined for a general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. An MSS exists and, under minor continuity assumptions, it is also unique.The MSS...

This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. The output of a coalition is determined by the sum of productivities if the coalition exceeds a minimal threshold of members. We consider competitive societies in which the surplus of a coalition is split...