We study to what extent consumers forego personal gains to avoid or reduce the harm their choices impose on others. In the absence of regulation, such voluntary compensation provides a way for consumers to internalize negative externalities on their own. However, the tangibility of consumption...

We study to what extent consumers forego personal gains to avoid or reduce the harm their choices impose on others. In the absence of regulation, such voluntary compensation provides a way for consumers to internalize negative externalities on their own. However, the tangibility of consumption...

This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative...

Two-sided market models in which platforms compete via two-part tariffs, i.e. a subscription and a per-transaction fee, are often plagued by a continuum of equilibria. This paper augments existing models by allowing for heterogeneous rading behavior of agents on both sides. We show that this...