In this work, a new axiomatization of the Shapley value is presented. An associated game is constructed which can also be interpreted as a perturbation of the original game. We define a sequence of games, when the term of order n, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order (n-1).

In the context of capital accumulation games this paper proposes two concepts that describe the interactions between agents and give a counterpart, in a symmetric infinite horizon framework, of the well known Fudenberg and Tirole's Taxinomy concerning investment strategies in two-stage games.

This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Other axiomatizations can be found in the literature: Owen (1977), Hart and Kurz (1983), and Winter (1992). The driving force of my axiomatization is a consistency axiom based on an associated...

This paper introduces four alternative representations of a set function: the Mobius transformation, the co-Mobius transformation, and the interactions between elements of any subset of a given set as extensions of Shapley and Banzhaf values. The links between the five equivalent representations...