In this paper, we examine how financial leverage and information quality interactively affect the equilibrium investment and effort decisions, therefore affect overall efficiency. We find that when the financial leverage is in an intermediate range, overall efficiency may decrease in information...

In this paper, we study the seniority orders between a firm's external debts and its inside-debt compensation to its manager, and analyze how different seniority orders influence equilibrium inside debt and external debt, as well as efficiency. We find the equilibrium inside debt varies with...

In this study, we show that when a firm needs external financing, information quality has real effects via financing contracts on the firm's input to influence its operational outcome. Interestingly, we find that higher information quality decreases overall efficiency. Our analysis highlights...

In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of imposing scrutiny to fight firms' information garbling. We study a setting in which both firms with good and bad projects are able to influence the informativeness of a public signal regarding their project types through unobservable efforts, and...

In this study we examine whether imposing a penalty based on an earlier positive signal and a bad realized outcome can be welfare-improving. We find that imposing a penalty helps to improve investment efficiency, but it also brings a deadweight cost of potential penalty for entrepreneurs with...