We propose during periods of natural disasters, there is greater scope for the frequency and severity of market manipulation due to distraction and investor misestimations. For the population of U.S. stocks from 2007-2018, we merge intra-day manipulation data from SMARTS / NASD with National...

We propose that market manipulation, which brings about both managerial short-termism and an opaque environment, has a negative causal impact on the four dimensions of corporate culture: compete, control, create, and collaborate. We test this proposition by matching corporate culture dimensions...

Natural disasters exacerbate swings in investor sentiment and information asymmetry. As such, we propose natural disasters enable more frequent and severe market manipulation. We test this proposition using the securities listed in the NYSE and NASDAQ, disaster data from the National Oceanic and...

I examine if the firms in the same industry make similar decisions when they share large institutional owners. This relationship is important given the tremendous rise of common institutional owners and their significance on their portfolio firms’ policies. I hypothesize that common...

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...