The paper analyzes the equilibrium on the credit market when a bank and a platform compete to offer credit to borrowers. The platform does not manage deposit accounts, but acts as an intermediary between the borrower and the investor, offering a risky contract such that the investor is only...

Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for...

This article provides a descriptive overview of the payment card industry in Europe and compares the various forms of organization of payment card systems in European countries. This synthesis helps to understand the paradoxes and the challenges entailed in the creation of the Single Euro...

In this paper, we study the development of mobile payments as an innovation in developed countries. In particular, we introduce five cooperation models that have emerged or could emerge between banks, mobile network operators, and payment systems, for the development of this new payment method....

This paper studies the incentives of a merchant to bypass a payment platform by issuing private cards. In our model, a payment platform allocates the total cost of a card transaction between a monopolistic issuer and a monopolistic acquirer by choosing an "interchange fee". We determine how the...

This article examines the divergence between the profit maximizing and the welfare maximizing interchange fees when two issuing banks, which compete for deposits, share a debit card platform and their ATM networks. It suggests some guidelines for regulatory intervention to reduce inefficiencies...