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We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333361
Motivated by school admission systems used in, e.g., Turkey and Sweden, this paper investigates a sequential two-stage admission system with public and private schools. To perform the analysis, relevant axioms and equilibrium notions need to be tailored for the considered dynamic setting. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208839
Agents are farsighted when they consider the ultimate consequences of their actions. We re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting with transfers, where farsighted coalitions are considered fundamental behavioral units, and the equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503093
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250132
We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064897
Stability and "no justified envy" are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840050
As a random allocation rule for indivisible object allocation problems under weak priorities, deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking (DA-STB) is not ex-post constrained efficient. We first observe that it also fails to satisfy a natural fairness notion, symmetry at the top, which requires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012844514
Despite significant efforts, segregation in the US public schools still persists. It mainly occurs between, but not within, school districts. To overcome this problem, inter-district admissions have been introduced, and many school districts have been integrated in a handful of states. We study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951017
The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools for 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this divided enrollment system and show that an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952522
When allocating indivisible objects, agents might have equal priority rights for some objects. A common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic allocation mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956467