We consider a stable improvement problem in a controlled school choice model which covers those of several previous studies. First, we consider the case where the priority for each school is a weak order. We derive a sufficient condition for a stable matching to be constrained efficient. It is...

We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time slots in public tennis courts. Given an allocation,...

This paper presents two novel graph-based mechanisms: the "multidimensional second-price" (MSP) and "multidimensional English" auctions. In high-stakes auctions, externalities are commonplace and create many problems. For example, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism may require losers to pay....

We investigate the similarities and differences between matching markets and other canonical economic settings in the presence of complementarity. In particular, we explain the formal connections between the structure of matching markets with complementary contracts and games with strategic...

Affirmative action policies often take two forms: quotas, where a certain number of individuals from underrepresented minority groups are to be admitted; and priority subsidies, where these individuals are given higher admissions scores relative to some baseline. Should a policymaker concerned...

In many real-world matching applications, there are restrictions for institutions either on priorities of their slots or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). Motivated by the need in such real-life matching problems, this paper formulates a family of practical choice...

Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold without the assumption of quasi-linear...

Online platforms that match customers with service providers utilize a wide variety of designs: some implement a searchable directory of one side of the market (i.e., Airbnb, Google Local Services); some allow both sides of the market to search and initiate contact (i.e., Upwork, Care.com);...

We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The...

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic...