We document that firms included in the ExecuComp database tend to be larger, more complex, followed by more analysts, have greater stock liquidity levels, and have higher total, but less concentrated, institutional ownership than other firms. Based on these differences, we test and find support...

We examine whether compensation consultants' potential cross-selling incentives explain more lucrative CEO pay packages using 755 firms from the Samp;P 1500 for 2006. Critics allege that these incentives lead consultants to bias their advice to secure greater revenues from their clients (Waxman,...

We examine the extent to which participation constraints influence CEO annual equity grants. Studying CEO equity grants over the period 2006-2016 and using equity grants to compensation peers as a proxy for the reservation equity grant level, we find that the reservation wage in equity is a...

Contingent considerations (earnouts) in acquisition agreements provide sellers with future payments conditional on meeting certain conditions. Prior research provides evidence that acquiring firms use earnouts to minimize agency costs associated with acquisitions. Using earnout fair value...

We examine the relation between shareholder investment horizon and CEO horizon incentives derived from compensation contracts. We find that influential incumbent shareholders provide managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these shareholders plan to sell their...

We examine whether companies select compensation peer groups opportunistically to increase CEO pay. Using 608 firms from the Samp;P 1500, 2,154 peer firms identified from their proxy statements, and a pool of potential peers representing the firm's labor market in which it competes for talent,...

Executive equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders. Equity incentive plans are an important precursor to equity grants because plan terms give boards of directors discretion over the amount and features of equity that can be granted...

We analyze the promotions and firings of NCAA Division 1 college basketball and college football coaches to assess whether these coaches are rewarded for the academic performance of their players in promotion and retention decisions. We find that an increase in Academic Progress Rate, as...

Economic theory predicts that insiders reveal private information when they trade equity in their firm. However, insider purchases to meet equity holding requirements or sales to satisfy liquidity needs do not reveal private information. We predict that contract terms stipulating CEO equity...

Prior research establishes that boards of directors can encourage risk-averse managers to take risky actions by providing stock options and severance pay. We demonstrate that the ability of these incentives to encourage risk-taking hinges on the level of uncertainty facing the manager, and that...