This paper advances the literature on distributive politics by analyzing a form of political favoritism driven by the career uncertainties faced by officials. We argue that political leaders provide regime insiders with favors in a high-risk environment. To empirically test this political risk...

This paper analyzes the distortionary effect of political career incentives on fiscal extraction. We argue that competitive promotion tournaments distort public officials' career incentives, leading to excessive tax extraction efforts. We empirically estimate the magnitude of distortion by...

This study analyzes how authoritarian leaders use the judicial system to solve the principal-agent problem in the government hierarchy. We argue that autocrats recentralize court personnel to enhance the central government's monitoring power over local officials. We test this executive...

What determines the dynamic patterns of local public investment in authoritarian countries? We analyze a unique dataset that matches public-private partnership (PPP) projects with Chinese mayors who served from 2010 to 2017, and document a robust tenure effect in public investment. Mayors...

Firms around the world benefit from building connections with politicians. In this paper, I develop a theory of political risk to account for the conditionality of returns to political connections. I theorize that the uncertain status of public officials is a political risk that undermines the...

What determines the dynamic patterns of local public investment in authoritarian countries? We analyze a unique dataset that matches public-private partnership (PPP) projects with Chinese mayors who served from 2010 to 2017, and document a robust tenure effect in public investment. Mayors...

This study analyses a mechanism to explain how internal mobility in the dominant party enhances authoritarian resilience. We argue that authoritarian leaders incentivize their political agents to advance economic development by using age-based promotion and retirement rules. We empirically...