This paper develops a lobbying-by-firms model that draws on a more realistic characterization of the lobbying process …, modeling approach furnishes theoretical support for why one encounters different numbers of lobbying firms of varying sizes in …) casting out the role of money from the lobbying process. Theoretical legs are also furnished for the empirical finding of a …

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our … much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model … yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the …

This paper develops a lobbying-by-firms model that draws on a more realistic characterization of the lobbying process …, modeling approach furnishes theoretical support for why one encounters different numbers of lobbying firms of varying sizes in …) casting out the role of money from the lobbying process. Theoretical legs are also furnished for the empirical finding of a …

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our … much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model … yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the …

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our … much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model … yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the …