We show that dealer market power impedes the pass-through of monetary policy in repo markets, which is an important first stage of monetary policy transmission. In the European repo market, most participants do not have access to trade on centralized exchanges. Rather, they rely on OTC...

We show that dealer market power impedes the pass-through of monetary policy in the European repo market. The current literature has mostly centered around collateral scarcity, where scarce and heterogeneous collateral causes repo rates to fall below policy rates and diverge across collateral...

We show that dealer market power impedes the pass-through of monetary policy in repo markets, which is an important first stage of monetary policy transmission. In the European repo market, most participants do not have access to trade on centralized exchanges. Rather, they rely on OTC...

We analyze the run risk of USD-backed stablecoins. Stablecoin issuers aim to keep the stablecoin price at $1 by holding a portfolio of US dollar assets like bank deposits, Treasuries, and corporate bonds while promising to exchange stablecoins for $1 in cash with arbitrageurs. We show that asset...

This paper uses new data to reexamine trends in concentration in U.S. markets from 1994 to 2019. The paper's main contribution is to construct concentration measures that reflect narrowly defined consumption-based product markets, as would be defined in an antitrust setting, while accounting for...

We analyze data on tens of thousands of alternating-offer, business-to-business negotiations in the wholesale used-car market, with each negotiation mediated (over the phone) by a third-party company. The data shows the identity of the employee mediating the negotiations. We find that who...

We present both theory and evidence that increased competition may decrease rather than increase consumer welfare in subprime credit markets. We present a model of lending markets with imperfect competition, adverse selection and costly lender screening. In more competitive markets, lenders have...