This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes thruthtelling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only...

This dissertation addresses the question of whether a monopolistic banking system can lead to a higher steady state level of capital stock. Specifically, this research analyzes the comparative advantage of a monopoly banking system. By doing that, it examines factors that contribute to the...

Offshore sources, in both shallow and deep waters, are increasingly important contributors to global oil and natural gas production. As both resource owner and taxing authority, national governments play an important role in the production of these offshore hydrocarbons. How the policy choices...

In this paper, we analyze the asymmetric pure strategy equilibria in a dynamic game of pure information externality. Each player receives a private signal and chooses whether and when to invest. In some of the periods, only a subgroup of the players make decisions, which we call bunching, while...

Based on a previous study by Amador and Weill (2009), I study thediffusion of dispersed private information in a large economy subject to a”catastrophe risk” state. I assume that agents learn from the actions of oth-ers through two channels: a public channel, that represents learning...

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be...

In this paper, we analyze the asymmetric pure strategy equilibria in a dynamic game of pure information externality. Each player receives a private signal and chooses whether and when to invest. In some of the periods, only a subgroup of the players make decisions, which we call bunching, while...

We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider...