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In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649163
In this paper we model an evolutionary process with perpetual random shocks where individual behavior is determined by imitation. Every period an agent is randomly chosen from each of n finite populations to play a game. Each agent observes a sample of population-specific past strategy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649201
Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649382
This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005549093
We revisit the question of price formation in general equilibrium theory. We explore whether evolutionary forces lead to Walrasian equilibrium in the context of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). Market games have Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some, and possibly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550949
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We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p [less-than-or-equals, slant] 1 of participating. A unique symmetric equilibrium is found for any n and p and its properties are analyzed. In particular, we show that for a fixed n > 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending is...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008483526
We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008492111
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