Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is … prevailing cooperation levels among employees before they can set incentives to promote cooperation. In addition, employees … matched to informed managers learn that the manager could base their incentive choice on cooperation levels. We find no …

Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is … prevailing cooperation levels among employees before they can set incentives to promote cooperation. In addition, employees … matched to informed managers learn that the manager could base their incentive choice on cooperation levels. We find no …

Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is … prevailing cooperation levels among employees before they can set incentives to promote cooperation. In addition, employees … matched to informed managers learn that the manager could base their incentive choice on cooperation levels. We find no …

durables. Who opts into the transaction when given such incentives? We show theoretically and experimentally that increasing …

ignorance, because it provides a convenient excuse for not getting informed. We conduct a laboratory experiment with resolvable …

experiment, we introduce exogenous variation in the opportunity costs of time. Contrary to claims in the previous literature, we …

We use a laboratory experiment to understand the channels through which honesty oaths can affect behavior and …

We show how sanctioning is more effective in increasing cooperation between groups than within groups. We study this … using a trust game among ethnically diverse subjects in Afghanistan. In the experiment, we manipulate i) sanctioning and ii … where ethnic identity is salient. Our results suggest that formal institutions for enforcing cooperation are more effective …