This article studies the role of participation in the budgeting process when the company has to coordinate two interdependent divisions. The focus lies on the design of the budgeting process (top-down vs. participative budgets) and the underlying supply of information. This is studied in a...

This study examines how a strategic tax auditor affects a multinational firm's transfer pricing in an incomplete information tax compliance game. Our model uses a divisionalized firm, in both a low-tax and a high-tax country, that decides to implement a transfer-pricing regime with either one or...

Large multinational companies are regularly suspected of using transfer pricing of intangibles to shift profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the optimal transfer prices while endogenizing the location choice of intangibles and considering spillovers. In line with the initial...

This article studies the role of participation in the budgeting process when the company has to coordinate two interdependent divisions. The focus lies on the design of the budgeting process (top-down vs. participative budgets) and the underlying supply of information. This is studied in a...

The Internet Appendix includes formal claims and proofs for the alternative sequence section. The original paper `When do firms use one set of books in an international tax compliance game?' is available at the following URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3012231