We examine whether politically active firms play a role in disseminating political information via their management guidance. We use multiple proxies based on campaign financing activity or the presence of a government affairs office to capture whether a firm is politically active. We find that...

We show that financial shocks to lenders affect the composition of covenants in new debt contracts in a way that cannot be explained by borrower fundamentals. Using two distinct measures of lender-specific shocks—defaults in a lender's corporate loan portfolio that occur outside the borrower's...

We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the tax consequences of renegotiating U.S. syndicated loans to isolate the effect of renegotiation costs on initial contract terms. TD9599 materially reduced the tax burden of renegotiating U.S. syndicated loans, while leaving the taxation of...

We examine how corruption influences the mortgage market. Prior research documents that corruption is most costly in cases, like home buying, where government interaction is frequent and necessary. Accordingly, after anti-corruption laws pass bank-offices both accept more mortgage applications,...