The main ingredient of this paper is the derivation of the Generalized Price equation. This generalizes the original Price equation in the sense that it produces a set of Price-like equations, one for every different underlying model that one could assume has generated the data. All of these...

The main ingredient of this paper is the derivation of the generalized version of Hamilton's rule. This version is derived with the Generalized Price equation. The generalized version of Hamilton's rule generalizes the original rule, in the sense that it produces a set of rules; one rule for...

Most of the literature on the evolution of human pro-sociality looks at reasons why evolution made us not play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners’ dilemmas or public goods games. We suggest that in order to understand human morality, and human prosocial behaviour, we should look at reasons why...

A widespread claim in evolutionary theory is that every group se- lection model can be recast in terms of inclusive fitness. Although there are interesting classes of group selection models for which this is possible, we show that it is not true in general. With a simple set of group selection...

This paper reviews and addresses a variety of issues relating to inclusive fitness. The main question is: are there limits to the generality of inclusive fitness, and if so, what are the perimeters of the domain within which inclusive fitness works? This question is addressed using two well...

We study antisocial preferences in simple money-burning tasks. A decision maker can choose whether or not to reduce another person's payoff at an own cost. We vary across tasks the initial endowment of the decider and the victim. We find that most conventional expectations are refuted: Subjects...

We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. To understand the dynamics, we extend a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. While this result delineates which payoffs can be...

Most of the literature on the evolution of human pro-sociality looks at reasons why evolution made us not play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners' dilemmas or public goods games. We suggest that in order to understand human morality, and human prosocial behavior, we should look at reasons why...

Evolutionary explanations of anger as a commitment device hinge on two key assumptions. The first is that it is predictable, ex-ante, whether someone will get angry when feeling that they have been badly treated. The second is that anger is associated with destructive behavior. We test the...

A widespread claim in evolutionary theory is that every group selection model can be recast in terms of inclusive fitness. Although there are interesting classes of group selection models for which this is possible, we show that it is not true in general. With a simple set of group selection...