Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry …. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where … analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in the U.S. over …

. The model reconciles informational theories of lobbying with empirical evidence suggesting that interest groups … group influence: from an ex ante perspective, informational lobbying negatively effects the welfare of legislators. The …

“informational lobbying market” and can be easily incentivized by policymakers to truthfully reveal private information. We also show …

lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect … behalf. Our analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in … legislating, we are able to explain why the share of commercial lobbyist activity in total lobbying has risen dramatically and now …

Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry …. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where … analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in the U.S. over …

"informational lobbying market" and can be easily incentivized by policymakers to truthfully reveal private information. We also show …

Can multinational firms exert more power than national firms by influencing politics through lobbying? To answer this … question, we analyze the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a … multinational; this changes for high transportation costs and intermediate damage parameters. When there is no lobbying, welfare …