We analyze the organization of corruption in a state agency. The dual mandate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's traffic police agency is to manage traffic and to enforce the traffic code. We first document that, in the capital's branch, Kinshasa, traffic violation fines account for only...

This article provides evidence from the Congo that social relationships with state officials can decrease one social cost of corruption, in the context of public transport. We first document that police stops can lead to long bribe negotiations. In response, some drivers and officers have built...

Within the field of economics, despite being widespread, African traditional religions tend to be perceived as unimportant and ignored when studying economic decision-making. This study tests whether this presumption is correct. Using daily data on business decisions and performance of beer...

We show that armed actors refrain from using their power to arbitrarily steal from an economy if, and only if, the armed actors' property rights over stealing from that economy are secure. By 2009, armed actors taxed, administered, and protected various villages in Democratic Republic of the...

We use variation in exposure to victimization of 1,537 households of eastern Congo for each year of 1990-2013 to examine the formation of preferences to participate in armed groups. In this context, most armed groups are Congolese militia, whose objective is fighting foreign armed groups. We...

Armed groups routinely delegate domains of rule to village customary chiefs--indirect rule. The larger a chief's power over the villagers relative to the group's, the more there is indirect rule. Over time, enabled by the chief's efforts to legitimize the group, the group expands the taxes they...