We exploit a natural experiment in which two professionals compete in a one-stage contest without strategic motives and where one contestant has a clear exogenous psychological momentum advantage over the other in order to estimate the causal effect of psychological momentum on performance. We...

The order of actions in contests may generate different psychological effects which, in turn, may influence contestants' probabilities to win. The Prouhet-Thue-Morse sequence in which the first 'n' moves is the exact mirror image of the next 'n' moves should theoretically terminate any advantage...

After the expansion of the FIFA World Cup from 32 to 48 teams starting from the 2026 edition, the initial proposal was to split the 48 national teams into 16 groups of three. Among other drawbacks, this proposal provides potential for collusion. Recently, after widespread criticism, FIFA...

Home advantage is a well-established phenomenon in professional football. However, the literature on the effect of the size of the crowd on home advantage has produced mixed results. The present study utilized data from all the games in the Chinese Super League between the 2011 and 2019 seasons....

We study round-robin tournaments with one prize and four symmetric players. There are three rounds, each of which includes two sequential matches where each player plays against a different opponent in every round. Each pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. We characterize the...

We study a best-of-three all-pay contest with two players in which the first player to win two games wins the contest. Each player has a value of winning the contest as well as a value of winning a single game. It is assumed that a player’s value of winning a game in his home field is...

We study round-robin tournaments with three players whose values of winning are common knowledge. In every stage a pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. The player who wins in two matches wins the tournament. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium for symmetric (all...

We study round-robin and elimination tournaments with three players where one player is dominant, i.e., he has a higher value of winning than his weaker opponents. In every stage, a pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. We demonstrate that the expected payoff of the weak players in...