This paper characterizes the asymptotic behavior of an ongoing society facing a repeated coordination problem. This society has a certain demographic structure: generations of individuals asynchronously supercede their "parents," creating an entry/exit process that allows individuals with...

Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the franchise? This paper develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We study properties of dynamic enfranchisement games, dynamic games in which political rights evolve over time....

This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner' Dilemma game. When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how "much" cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group...

This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in dynastic governments. It has been suggested that "horizontal accountability," i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of information. The...

This paper models status quo (SQ) protection of property rights. A politico-legal system determines eligibility of citizen-groups for protection. A ruling authority can reallocate property iff reallocation is preferable to the status quo for one such group. Along the solution path, SQ...

When are political institutions stable? When do they tend toward reform? This paper examines a model of dynamic, endogenous institutional change. We introduce the class of dynamic political games (DPGs), dynamic games in which the political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are chosen by the...

The standard model of repeated games assumes perfect synchronization in the timing of decisions between the players. In many natural settings, however, choices are made synchronously so that only one player can move at a given time. This paper studies a family of repeated settings in which...

This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of equilibria in alternating move repeated games with two players. Such games are canonical models of environments with repeated, asynchronous choices due to inertia or replacement. We focus our attention on Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE). These are...

The standard model of repeated games assumes perfect synchronization in the timing of decisions between the players. In many natural settings, however, choices are made synchronously so that only one player can move at a given time. This paper studies a family of repeated settings in which...

Authoritarian regimes often rely on targeting - unequal application of the law to isolate internal "enemies." At the same time, modern autocrats' methods of social control appear less draconian than those in the past. This study analyzes a dynamic model of authoritarian control. In the model, a...